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Abstract 
 This paper examines the impact that mutual relations among three non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) working with child labourers in El Salvador have on the overall 
effectiveness of their development assistance. One of the organizations examined leans 
towards an ‘adaptive’ approach to child labour, seeing the issue as an inevitable 
consequence of poverty that cannot be tackled separately from addressing other 
developmental problems. Another of the organizations advocates the use of an 
‘abolitionist’ approach to child labour, regarding child labour as a direct violation of 
children’s rights and hence morally wrong and in need of immediate abolition. The 
third organization falls in its approach somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, 
advocating strictly against child labour in theory but providing more realistic solutions 
in its actual work.  
 My findings on the collective effect of the NGOs’ work on child labour in El Salvador 
are not particularly encouraging. The organizations under study appear to neither 
collaborate nor greatly communicate with each other. Moreover, since their adopted 
approaches to child labour are at cross-purposes, they are essentially annulling each 
other’s efforts. I conclude with the observation that in order to increase their aid 
effectiveness, NGOs working in child labour, and in other divisive development topics, 
should be in closer coordination with each other as well as with the governments of the 
countries where they work.  
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I. Introduction 
Mainstream economic theory suggests that perfect competition among suppliers is the 
most effective manner of delivering goods and services, with government interventions 
generating usually undesirable market distortions. The aid market constitutes from this 
viewpoint somewhat of an exception, however. While some researchers believe that the fact 
that aid is provided by a myriad of different donors is positive as it begets more innovation 
and creative solutions, others highlight the possibility that donor proliferation without 
coordination weakens the overall impact of aid and potentially even harms the aid recipients. 
As a result of this concern, several high-level international initiatives aimed at improving 
donor coordination have taken place recently, including among others the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2007). These initiatives were, 
however, directed primarily at official multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, not at non-
governmental actors active in development assistance. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become in the recent years ever more 
popular vehicles for delivering development assistance (McCoskey 2009). The aid that they 
provide is not formally coordinated either but this reality is not regarded equally problematic 
since in comparison to official donors, NGOs are seen as more virtuous players due to a lack 
of political and economic interests that could befuddle their charitable ones. The necessity to 
formally coordinate NGO aid is further downplayed by the fact that most NGOs implement 
projects on a much smaller scale and in closer cooperation with local beneficiaries than 
official donors and hence are seen as directly and easily accountable to their ‘clients.’ This 
paper investigates on a case-study of NGOs working in the field of child labour in El 
Salvador whether these premises indeed hold true: what the nature of interaction among 
development NGOs working in this relatively controversial area is and how it is likely 
affecting the overall impact of their development projects.  
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II. Literature Review 
This section first introduces existing research regarding aid coordination both on the 
official and on the non-governmental level. It proceeds with a discussion of the issue of child 
labour, first globally and second specifically in El Salvador. Finally, it finishes with an 
identification of theoretical gaps to which my paper attempts to provide a contribution. 
 
II.1 Aid coordination 
It has been a well-known fact that the number of official donors and of their programs and 
projects in the developing world has been rising ever since the 1970s (Knack and Rahman 
2004). In the 2000s, however, the state of aid proliferation and fragmentation reached truly 
astonishing levels. According to Acharya et al. (2003), between 1999 and 2001, only four out 
of the total 22 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors were providing official 
development assistance to fewer than 90 recipients. In order to further illustrate the state of 
the situation, the authors mentioned the example of Vietnam, where in that time period 25 
official bilateral donors, 19 official multilateral donors, and 350 international NGOs operated 
a grand total of 8000 development projects, one per every 9000 people. 
Researchers generally agree that donor fragmentation and lack of coordination negatively 
impact aid recipients. Morss (1984) was perhaps the first author to point out that the dramatic 
increase in the number of development projects in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s had a 
harmful effect on the recipients’ institutions. Rather than identifying national development 
goals in line with populations’ needs, developing countries’ governments concentrated on 
accommodating the myriad of new donors and their various requirements instead. Knack and 
Rahman (2004) confirmed this view, demonstrating that the high number of donors working 
in most developing countries tends to weaken the countries’ administrative capacity. The 
underlying reason is that most donors focus only on maximizing their own projects’ 
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performance and disregard the development of the recipients’ human and organizational 
structures, which are, nonetheless, essential to long-term growth.  
Bigsten (2006) and Lawson (2010) added to the list of afflictions caused by donor 
proliferation and lack of coordination high transaction costs, duplication, and a loss of scale. 
The transaction costs involve the time and energy spent on dealing with paperwork for all the 
different development projects, which significantly increase with the number of projects 
regardless of their size (Bigsten 2006). Duplication refers to the distinct possibility that 
uncoordinated donors provide the same services in some sectors while none in others 
(Lawson 2010). Finally, vis-à-vis the loss of scale, non-cooperating individual donors tend to 
conduct predominantly smaller projects and only a few have the resources to undertake larger 
schemes such as energy and infrastructure improvements (Lawson 2010). 
Nevertheless, Frot and Santiso (2010), while not disputing that fragmented, uncoordinated 
aid can be harmful to the recipient countries, warned about too little donor competition. In 
case one donor dominates all the aid provided to one sector in any developing country, the 
aid is in their view unlikely to be provided in the most efficient manner possible. Moreover, a 
more numerous range of donors can beget more ideas, competition, and innovation, as well as 
represent a more consistent flow of funding (Lawson 2010). 
The international aid community eventually responded to the great increase in the number 
of donors and projects in the developing world with several high-level efforts at increasing 
aid effectiveness, with improving donor coordination and harmonization among the chief 
goals. The first initiative was the establishment of the DAC Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness (2003), followed by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
1
 (2005). In it, 
more than hundred countries and aid agencies agreed to improve donor division of labour via 
an increased use of common arrangements and procedures and of shared analysis. The Accra 
                                                          
1 Result of a High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in 2005 
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Agenda for Action (2008) reiterated these objectives, albeit in a slightly less authoritative 
tone.  
All the initiatives mentioned pertained primarily to official donors, however, not to NGOs 
working in development aid. That is not to say that the NGO sector was believed to be well-
coordinated already and therefore no efforts in that regard were needed. Rather, the 
predominant view has been that the potential lack of coordination among NGOs is less 
problematic than among official donor agencies and consequently that it does not require the 
same level of attention.  
The underlying reasons are twofold. First, NGOs are not believed to be motivated by 
political motives to the same extent as states (Easterly 2002, McCoskey 2009). Thus, the aid 
that they provide is more likely to be extended out of true solidarity, not out of the desire to 
influence the recipients’ policies, and the well-being of the aid recipients are more likely to 
be truly considered before the projects’ implementation. Second, NGOs generally operate 
small development projects that serve only subgroups of the countries’ populations and hence 
their need to coordinate with other NGOs serving other subgroups in a different part of the 
country are not as pressing as with official donors’ country-wide projects (McCoskey 2009). 
An extra advantage to the NGOs’ smaller size is their greater efficiency due to lower 
bureaucratic and administrative costs (Scott and Hopkins 1999). 
Empirical research on mutual NGO relations and on their effect on overall aid 
effectiveness has yielded mixed results. Some authors found NGO aid to be highly discordant 
and thus ineffective or even disruptive of the desired development goals (Oxfam 2000). For 
example, in examining the impact of NGO work on public health services in Mozambique, 
Pfeiffer (2003) concluded that the deluge of NGOs and expatriate health workers in the 1990s 
fragmented the local health care system and undermined local control of health programs. 
Another famous case of deficient NGO coordination has been in the aftermath of the 2005 
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tsunami in South-East Asia, which was followed by an inundation of well-meaning but often 
effort-duplicating humanitarian NGOs (Telford and Cosgrave 2007). Nevertheless, other 
authors found the existing state of NGO coordination to be relatively satisfactory (Edi and 
Setianingtias 2007, Moore et al. 2003, Ohler and Nunnenkamp 2012). Paris and Sisk (2009) 
along with Volz (2005) even warned that too-close coordination efforts among NGOs could 
result in the adoption of de-contextualized development approaches, not sufficiently tailored 
to specific local conditions. 
 
II.2 Child labour in the world 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines child labour as any work that 
deprives children of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, and that is harmful to 
their physical and mental development. According to the ILO’s latest estimates, currently 
there are 215 million child labourers worldwide, primarily in the developing world. Many of 
the children work full-time and do not attend school. Approximately two-thirds work in 
agriculture and one third is younger than 12 years. Only one out of each five child labourers 
works in paid employment (ILO 2013).  
Child labour was highly prevalent throughout the industrialized world as well until the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, when a combination of economic improvements and legislation 
brought about for the most part its elimination. This development was followed by a series of 
international initiatives aimed at eradicating child labour everywhere. In 1978, the ILO 
passed a Minimum Age Convention (no. 138), which fixed the minimum age at which 
children were allowed to work at 15 (14 in developing countries).  In 1999 the ILO followed 
with The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (no. 182), which stipulated that only 
children older than 17 years could work in certain specified ‘hazardous’ forms of work. Other 
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international conventions, most notably the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, also 
bound their signatories to do away with child labour. 
The agreement that child labour is undesirable is almost universal; however, the views 
about how it should be best tackled are highly divergent. On one side of the spectrum lie 
those who perceive the phenomenon to be an inevitable consequence of poverty - a so-called 
‘adaptive’ approach - and do not advocate for much specific intervention. For example, 
Dessy and Pallage (2004) disagree with the ILO legislation against child labour, even with 
the ban on the worst forms of child labour, claiming that parents who send their children to 
dangerous mines or to prostitution generally make a rational economic choice. In the authors’ 
view, a ban on such behaviour attempts to cure only the symptoms, not the causes of the 
problem, and thus is counterproductive. In a similar manner, Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) 
see child labour as an issue that should not be addressed through legislation and bans but 
rather through intra-country redistribution of wealth by progressive taxation and social 
welfare programs.  Some authors falling within this field of thought even posit that child 
labour is not always negative as it helps build character by teaching punctuality, discipline, 
and rigor (Ray 2000 cited in Dessy and Pallage 2004).  
On the opposite side of the spectrum lie the so-called ‘abolitionists’, who regard all child 
labour to be in dire violation of children’s human rights and hence morally wrong and in need 
of immediate elimination. Researchers and practitioners who adhere to this view generally 
support stronger child-labour legislation, both on the national and international levels, along 
with trade sanctions and boycotts to be used against countries and products that employ child 
labour. The economic argument underlying this line of thinking maintains that there are two 
possible market equilibriums in each economy where child labour is utilized -- one with 
children working and their parents receiving low wages and the other one with children not 
working and their parents’ wages higher, by an amount sufficient to compensate for the lack 
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of children’s income (Basu and Van 1998). From this perspective, an effectively enforced 
ban on child labour would resolve the problem in question in a short matter of time. Other 
researchers provide support for the abolitionist approach from a different angle -- they find 
that children from families with larger amounts of land or family businesses tend to actually 
work more than children from the poorest families, and thus a ban or alternatively awareness-
raising could put an end to child labour even without changing the families’ economic 
situation (Bhalotra and Heady 2003, Deb and Rosati 2004).  
Most development practitioners who work with child labour fall somewhere in between 
the two extreme sides of the spectrum. Nevertheless, they do tend to lean more to one side or 
the other. Organizations that are closely associated with the ILO, for instance, tend to 
advocate for a more abolitionist approach, while local organizations might likely focus more 
on the economic side of the problem.  
 
II.3 Child labour in El Salvador 
Turning to the specific case of El Salvador, currently there are approximately 170,000 
child labourers in the country, which constitutes nine per cent of all children between five and 
17 years of age (US Department of Labour [DoL] 2012). Only one per cent of children 
between five and nine years old work, whereas 10.5 per cent of children between 10 and 14 
and 23.8 percent of 15 to 17 year olds do so. 60 per cent of the working children live in rural 
areas and 73 per cent are boys. Only 50 per cent of the Salvadoran child labourers work in 
agriculture, as opposed to 60 per cent at the global level. 60 per cent of Salvadoran child 
labourers combine work with school and around 35 per cent receive some form of 
remuneration – again, in contrast with only 20 per cent at the global level. While there has 
been a reduction in the amount of child labour in the early 2000s, in 2009 – the last year for 
which data is thus far available – there has been an increase in the number of child labourers 
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as compared to 2007, undoubtedly as a consequence of the global economic crisis 
(Salvadoran Ministry of Economy [MINECON] 2010).  
The Salvadoran government signed and ratified all three of the most important child-
labour conventions discussed – the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as the 
two ILO child-labour conventions, no. 138 and no. 182. The prohibition on any child work 
prior to age 14 (12 in circumstances of extreme poverty) and on hazardous work prior to age 
18 has been grounded also in national law. In reality, however, the country has been for many 
years criticized by the ILO and other international bodies for failing to enforce the existing 
child labour legislation, particularly in the five sectors identified as the ‘worst forms of child 
labour’ in El Salvador: sugar cane cultivation, mollusk collection, trash collection, fireworks 
production, and prostitution. In their most recent reports, the ILO and the DoL extended some 
praise to the Salvadoran government for the new Let’s Go to School program, which provides 
free meals, textbooks, and uniforms to poor children and thus aims to reduce the incidence of 
child labour. Nevertheless, in the view of both the institutions, many problems with the 
approach to child labour in the country still remain, particularly with enforcing the existing 
prohibitions on children under 18 working in the ‘worst forms of child labour’.  
Aside from the national government, international organizations, and official aid agencies, 
non-governmental development organizations are also actively dealing with the issue of child 
labour in El Salvador. According to the ILO, only 12 NGOs are formally implementing child 
labour-related development projects. Nevertheless, the Directory of Development 
Organizations suggests that there are more than 450 NGOs working in El Salvador. At least a 
fourth to a half of these organizations work with children, which suggests that at the very 
least 100 NGOs in El Salvador are handling the child labour issue in one form or another. My 
own experience confirms this supposition, as two of the three NGOs from my study are not 
included on the ILO list of NGOs working with child labourers in El Salvador.  
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II.4 NGO coordination in the field of child labour – The expected contribution of my study 
The existing research discussed above suggests that non-governmental work in the 
development field is thus far not coordinated to a great extent. Nevertheless, while some 
researchers commented on the negative impact of this reality on aid effectiveness, most 
researchers consider the lack of coordination to be harmless and in some cases even 
beneficial to development goals, as it might indicate the presence of innovation and tailoring 
of projects to particular local needs.  
I aim to contribute to the existing pool of knowledge by focusing on a relatively 
controversial development topic of child labour - on which no agreement vis-à-vis the most 
appropriate approach exists thus far - and by examining how the mutual relations of NGOs 
working in this field affect the overall impact of their development assistance. With a view to 
the existing research, I expect to find that the NGOs examined do not coordinate their 
activities. However, it remains a matter of empirical investigation whether the overall impact 
of their work is consequently weakened, by duplicity, lack of cohesiveness, and a small scale 
of their projects, or rather strengthened, by providing a wide variety of ‘remedies’ to child 
labour closely adapted to the specific circumstances and needs of the aid recipients. 
 
III. Research Methods 
The findings reported in this paper are based on a case study of three development NGOs 
in El Salvador. I chose my cases from a pool of mid-size international NGOs that work with 
children; these requirements cut down the number of eligible organizations from the 450 
Salvadoran NGOs mentioned above to approximately 30. I randomly picked five NGOs, e-
mailed them in search of the project’s support, and received three positive responses. I do not 
believe that the fact that I ended up examining only those NGOs that agreed to the 
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collabouration introduced a major bias into the study, as the two NGOs that refused to work 
with me do not differ in external characteristics significantly from the three that I did study. It 
is more likely that the organizations declined due to a lack of time or manpower rather than 
due to a specific approach to child labour or to relations with other NGOs. In order to protect 
the NGOs’ employees as well as their projects in El Salvador, I do not identify the 
organizations’ by their real names. Instead, I use the following monikers: Alliance, Bond, and 
Closer.  
I examined the three NGOs in person during two fieldwork trips. The first trip took place 
in January and February of 2007, while the second one in November 2010. I conducted both 
formal and informal interviews with the NGOs’ employees and with the beneficiaries of their 
projects. I also interviewed several government and ILO workers. I supplemented the data 
obtained through interviews by participant observation as well as by the study of various 
documents produced by the NGOs.  
The main goal of my data collection was to obtain information regarding two issues. First, 
I was trying to find out each NGO’s approach to child labour along with the main factors 
underlying the specific ideological stance. Second, I aimed to discover whether and how the 
policies adopted towards child labour affected the NGOs’ collabouration with one other and 
with other development NGOs. 
 
IV. Discussion of Results 
This section first discusses how the NGOs under exploration view and work with child 
labourers and second how these positions might affect their mutual relations. 
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III.1 NGOs’ approach to child labour 
In view of the contradictory opinions among researchers regarding how child labour 
should best be tackled, it is not surprising that each of the three NGOs studied has adopted a 
unique approach to dealing with child labour. A close analysis of the data gathered suggests 
that the specific choices might have been largely inspired by the NGOs’ sources of funding 
and relations with other organizations (‘mother’ NGOs and the ILO). 
 
III.1a Alliance 
Out of the three NGOs that I have studied, Alliance is the organization most closely 
aligned with the ‘adaptive’ side of the spectrum in its dealing with child labour. It is a mid-
size NGO loosely tied to a Western ‘mother’ NGO2 and ‘sister’ NGOs3 scattered primarily 
throughout Latin America. It does not cooperate closely with the ILO and obtains a large part 
of its funding through smaller private and often local donations. Both of these factors seem to 
make it more attuned to the poverty aspect rather than to the human-rights aspect of child 
labour.  
Alliance has worked in El Salvador for almost half a century and its main activities 
revolve around the creation and operation of elementary schools, establishment of vocational 
training centers and travelling vocational workshops, promotion of integral child 
development from the earliest age, and street education. It does not have a formally defined 
child-labour policy and according to its director, it does not need one. When doing projects 
with children, the organization does not inquire if they are working and certainly does not 
discourage them from doing so. Rather, through the vocational training – open to all from the 
age of 10 - Alliance provides children with the tools to find better paid, safer, and more 
professional employment than the one in which they currently might be working. At the same 
                                                          
2 By “mother” NGO, I refer to the founding NGO, most often somewhere in the Western world, which then went on to establish subsidiary 
branches in developing countries. 
3 By “sister” NGO, I mean the other subsidiary NGO branches in other developing countries. 
13 
 
time, the NGO facilitates the children’s school attendance, by providing them in their schools 
with free supplies and uniforms
4
. The overall impact of Alliance’s work on the number of 
child labourers is not clearly negative. In fact, it is possible that the organization’s work 
actually increases their number, as according to some Alliance’s employees it is not 
uncommon that the organization’s vocational workshops enable 12-13 year old children that 
were previously going to school and working part-time in agriculture to obtain full-time paid 
employment and hence abandon school attendance altogether.  
In its stance towards child labour, Alliance is motivated by a belief that the phenomenon is 
a clear outcome of poverty and can be cured only through progressive economic 
development. In this conviction, it closely resembles the opinions of many child labourers 
and their parents in my study. When I interviewed several children that work in the extraction 
of mollusks –one of the ‘worst’ forms of Salvadoran child labour – along with their parents, 
they expressed the view that although the work is unpleasant or even outright repulsive, it 
constitutes their only means of earning enough money to provide sufficient food for the 
whole family. Moreover, they pointed out that several years of schooling were not going to 
make any difference in their lives and thus school attendance was perhaps not helpful in any 
way. While the belief in the futility of education is likely short-sighted, in this instance the 
work of Alliance that would provide the child labourers with a different set of vocational 
skills could be very helpful. 
Alliance’s approach to child labour differs greatly from that of the ILO as well as from the 
official stance of the government. However, as the organization does not work closely with 
the ILO and its projects are quite small-scale, it has not attracted any criticism or even 
attention of the ILO or of any other child-labour-abolitionist organizations. Moreover, the 
NGO obtains a large portion of its funding from private donations and church organizations 
                                                          
4 This activity might be of less importance since the 2011 inception of the governmental Let’s Go to School program, which provides free 
school supplies, uniforms, and meals to all poor children attending public schools 
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and thus its projects do not often come under the scrutiny of official aid agencies. Finally, 
Alliance does not diverge in its approach far from some social welfare programs operated by 
the Salvadoran government itself, particularly from the Red Solidaria, which provides cash 
transfers to poor families without inquiring whether their children are economically active. 
However, even if the government were strictly enforcing the existing bans on child labour in 
its own programs and projects, it does not monitor NGO projects closely enough to know 
their exact content and ban them in case they are contrary to Salvadoran national policies.  
 
III.1b Bond 
In its child-labour policies, Bond finds itself situated somewhere in between the ‘adaptive’ 
and the ‘abolitionist’ approach. The organization forms part of an NGO family that is both 
larger and more globally present than Alliance’s. That is probably one of the reasons why 
Bond receives a larger part of its funding from official aid agencies and from its Western 
‘mother’ NGO than from private donations and why it has closer ties with the ILO. 
Consequently, the organization formally subscribes to the abolitionist rhetoric regarding child 
labour; nevertheless, it does not strictly enforce such policies in its projects. 
Bond has been working in El Salvador since the 1970s and it focuses on all aspects of life 
crucial to children’s development including health, education, economic development, 
environmental conservation, and infrastructure. It works in communities where it provides 
primary health care for children and youth, educational support to local schools, human rights 
advocacy (primarily against child abuse), and economic support to the children’s parents.  
The activities with the most likely impact on child labour are Bond’s work in education 
and in economic development. Until recently, Bond used to encourage school attendance 
among children through the provision of school supplies and uniforms. Nevertheless, as the 
government stepped in to fill this role with the Let’s Go to School program, the NGO now 
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focuses more on making the Salvadoran school system more flexible and better able to 
prepare students for entry into the labour force, by providing training to teachers and modern 
supplies to schools. Through these efforts, Bond is trying to encourage and make it possible 
for children to stay in school, even alongside their jobs.  
In the field of economic development, Bond provides the parents of the children with 
whom it works with vocational training workshops, business workshops, and micro-loans. 
The vocational training workshops help people gain new skills and thus find jobs more 
lucrative than working in agriculture, primarily as bakers, tailors, auto-mechanics, and 
electro-technicians. The business workshops on the other hand aspire to equip people with the 
skills necessary to open their own businesses, such as in accounting, finance, commerce, and 
marketing strategies. People who successfully finish the business workshops qualify to 
receive a micro-loan at a zero interest rate that is supposed to enable a launch of the small 
business in mind. The common goal of these initiatives is to increase the earning potential of 
the children’s parents and hence make it possible for their children to focus more on school 
and to work less.  
With the two activities discussed above, Bond addresses primarily the poverty-side of 
child labour; however, the organization also gives some credit to the ‘abolitionist’ side of the 
argument that advocates against the phenomenon as intrinsically harmful to children’s 
development. Thus, while Bond does not condition the participation in its programs on child 
labourers ceasing to work, it attempts to make it possible for children to stop working not 
only through increasing their parents’ incomes and through making schooling more relevant 
and flexible, but also through raising parental awareness of the possibly detrimental impact of 
labour on their children. It also formally disapproves of child labour, particularly of its 
‘worst’ forms.  
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This middle-of-the-spectrum approach to child labour fits well with Bond’s position vis-à-
vis its relations with the ILO and its sources of funding. The organization collabourates in 
some projects with the ILO and has received funding from it in the past. Bond also receives a 
certain portion of its funding from the US government, which is very abolitionist in its view 
of child labour. Such sources of collabouration would probably not be possible without 
Bond’s formally verbalized stance against child labour. At the same time, Bond’s ‘mother’ 
NGO, which is also its most important source of funding, considers child labour to be 
primarily a product of poverty and does not emphasize bans against it. Consequently, it is 
easier to understand why Bond’s formal position against child labour is not always executed 
in practice.  
 
III.1c Closer 
Out of the three NGOs examined, Closer is the organization most ‘abolitionist’ in its 
treatment of child labour. Even though it is a somewhat smaller NGO than Bond, both in El 
Salvador and more globally, it cooperates more closely with the ILO and receives a large 
majority of its funding from the US Government
5
. Consequently, Closer formally proclaims 
that child labour is highly undesirable, internationally illegal, and gravely detrimental to 
development. Moreover, unlike Bond, Closer also follows through with the abolitionist 
approach in its projects and policies. 
Closer has been working in El Salvador for almost sixty years, longer than either Alliance 
or Bond. Among its main areas of focus are health, education, democracy and governance 
support, and emergency response. The activities most acutely geared towards tackling child 
labour are the educational ones. 
                                                          
5 The US Government, as I have mentioned previously, is very abolitionist in its view of child labour. 
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Within these activities, Closer has tried to develop a two-pronged approach in its efforts to 
eradicate child labour. On one hand, the organization regards the Salvadoran educational 
system as rigid, ineffective, and incapable of providing many graduates with the skills 
necessary to obtaining a decent job and attempts to address these deficiencies with various 
own projects. For example, Closer affords some of its beneficiaries with the support to send 
their children to pre-schools, which in the organization’s view increase the children’s 
likelihood of finishing elementary school. For older children, Closer organizes afternoon 
study-halls, where its employees provide help with schoolwork to students lagging behind, 
many of them (former) child labourers. With these activities, Closer hopes to increase the rate 
of students that remain in school and hence indirectly decrease the number of children that 
work. 
On the other hand, Closer also conducts activities that aim to eliminate child labour more 
directly. First, it raises awareness about the harmful nature of child labour among both 
students and children’s parents. In a belief that many children work because their parents 
consider it a beneficial experience rather than purely due to poverty, the organization’s 
employees often visit children’s parents (in their projects) to talk to them about other options 
of increasing income that would allow their children not to work and focus purely on 
education. One of the employees interviewed mentioned a case of a Salvadoran fisherman 
with two sons, an eight and a ten-year-old, who did not attend school but went fishing with 
their father every day. Following Closer’s intervention, the father sent the two sons to school 
and spent every day six, instead of three, hours at sea, earning the same amount as previously. 
While this example sounded somewhat unusual, as most child labourers interviewed 
indicated a real necessity to work due to their families’ dire poverty, it is possible that in 
some – or maybe even many – cases, children’s remuneration could be compensated by their 
parents’ increasing their working hours. Second, while Closer does not have the power to 
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issue sanctions to the parents of child labourers directly, it sometimes cooperates with the 
ILO in identifying children working in the ‘worst’ forms of child labour and notifying the 
relevant authorities about the fact.  
Closer’s ‘abolitionist’ approach to child labour corresponds well with its relations with the 
ILO and with its sources of funding. Many Closer’s programs were conceived of in direct 
cooperation with the ILO and receive ILO funding. As a result, Closer’s education and 
awareness-raising projects are generally larger in scale than Alliance’s and Bond’s. 
Furthermore, more than 70 per cent of Closer’s funding comes from the US Government, a 
strong supporter of the abolitionist approach to child labour. Both the ILO and USAID funds 
would probably be compromised if Closer did not adhere more-or-less to the same view of 
child labour as the organizations themselves advocate.  
 
Table 1. The NGO’s Views on Child Labour, Ties with Other Organizations, and Sources of Funding 
NGO 
Approach to Child 
Labour 
Relationships with Other 
Institutions/ Mother NGOs 
Funding 
Alliance Close to an Adaptive 
approach 
Out of the three, the most 
“locally based” NGO,  only 
loosely connected to its 
"mother" and "sister" NGOs and 
has no relations with the ILO 
Funding  raised mostly 
privately and from church 
institutions 
Bond Somewhere between an 
Adaptive and an 
Abolitionist Approach 
Some ties and cooperation with 
the ILO, relations with "mother" 
and "sister" NGOs stronger than 
Alliance 
Half the funding obtained 
from small private donations, 
the other half from official 
donor agencies, including the 
US Government 
Closer Close to an Abolitionist 
approach 
Strong links both with the ILO 
and the US government; in 
many projects collaborates with 
the ILO and the Salvadoran 
government. In terms of the 
relationship to the “mother" 
NGO, Closer is the least 
autonomous out of the three 
NGOs examined 
Closer obtains more than 70 
per cent of its funding from 
the US government, the rest 
comes from the ILO and 
private donations 
Source: author’s own observations and analysis 
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III.2 Relations among the NGOs and how they are affected by their stance on child labour 
Interviews conducted with the three NGOs’ employees indicated that the organizations not 
only do not collabourate in their projects that touch on child labour, they do not communicate 
either and some do not even know of the others’ existence. For example, neither Bond nor 
Closer knew of Alliance. Bond and Closer were familiar with each others’ names, but only 
Bond was aware that Closer was working on child-labour issues, not vice versa
6
. That 
knowledge, however, did not inspire Bond to attempt to collabourate with Closer on its own 
child-labour project. This lack of coordination and communication most likely extends 
beyond Alliance, Bond, and Closer to other NGOs working on child issues in El Salvador, as 
none of the three NGOs examined mentioned being involved in any significant cooperation 
with any other NGO in the country.  
The finding that the three NGOs do not coordinate their activities was expected; 
nonetheless, as I have stated earlier, it remained a matter of empirical analysis to determine 
whether the overall impact of such non-coordination was positive or negative. The possibly 
negative effects in this case seem clear. By working alone, the projects of the NGOs that I 
examined are small in scale as well as in duration, which certainly diminishes their potential 
impact. Moreover, it is possible that the NGOs duplicate their efforts – where for instance 
both Alliance and Bond offer school supplies to children from the same family. While to my 
knowledge this has not in fact occurred, one can easily imagine that it could happen as the 
organizations do not talk to each other and people receiving benefits are not likely to turn 
them down, even if they have received similar benefits from another organization already. 
The potentially positive effects of the non-coordination could involve tailoring of the small 
NGO projects to suit exactly the needs of the particular recipients, which would perhaps not 
be possible with projects of larger size coordinated from far away. Unfortunately, none of the 
                                                          
6 This was probably the case because Closer was working with the ILO and thus its projects were more visible. 
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data that I collected suggested that any of the three NGOs designed their child-labour projects 
based on significant input from the project recipients. Rather, the approach adopted seemed 
to be dictated more by the sources of funding on which the NGO relied and on the closeness 
of its ties with the ILO.  
This point leads me to the most disappointing and disturbing finding that emerged from 
the data analysis. The NGOs seem to be working at cross-purposes with regard to the issue of 
child labour and thus might be completely annulling the results of each other’s work. 
Alliance does not see bans against even the worst forms of child labour as productive and 
Closer does its outmost to encourage parents and employers to respect such bans. Thus, one 
can easily picture an occurrence in which one family’s children are first taken away from 
their jobs in response to Closer’s pressure and subsequently sent for vocational training and 
straight back into the labour market by Alliance. Such a situation probably never actually 
arose, since Alliance, Bond, and Closer work in different parts of El Salvador. There are 
many other NGOs in the country working on children’s issue, though, with approaches to 
child labour that cover the full spectrum between ‘adaptive’ and ‘abolitionist’, and hence it is 
very possible that their activities and projects did in fact go against each other at some point. 
However, even if such a situation never actually occurred, the fact that the divergent 
approaches to child labour are contradictory and work against each other is a reality.  
The clashing nature of the child-labour projects has at least two detrimental effects. First, 
it undoubtedly decreases the overall effectiveness of aid dedicated to the issue, in the least 
from the donors’ perspective, as some children are trained and encouraged to work and 
perhaps as a result abandon schooling while other children are banned from working and sent 
back to school. The second and even more worrisome negative impact is that the decision 
whether a particular child will be offered vocational training or school support is not decided 
upon with a view to his/her circumstances and abilities but rather based on which of the 
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various NGOs happens to work in his/her area and to what ideology regarding child labour it 
happens to ascribe. Thus, based on the data available, it is all but impossible to draw a 
different conclusion than that the aid provided by NGOs’ in El Salvador in the controversial 
issue of child labour seems to be of little effectiveness at best and appears to lack any serious 
accountability to its recipients.  
 
V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to contribute to the existing literature on aid 
effectiveness by examining how mutual relations among Salvadoran NGOs working in the 
divisive development topic of child labour affect the overall impact of their projects. Extant 
research has indicated that similar to aid provided by official development agencies, NGO aid 
also tends to be relatively uncoordinated. Nevertheless, while some authors found this lack of 
coordination to be harmful to the NGOs’ development goals, others concluded that it did not 
bear any negative effect or could be even beneficial. With a view to these findings, I expected 
to discover that the NGOs that I studied did not coordinate their child-labour projects but 
whether it was for the good or for the bad remained a matter of empirical investigation.  
Analysis of the data that I collected during my examination of the work of three 
organizations in El Salvador – Alliance, Bond, and Closer – suggested that the NGOs not 
only did not coordinate their child-labour activities, their preferred approaches to the issue of 
child labour were at cross-purposes and thus were essentially annulling each other’s efforts. 
Based on an examination of the NGOs’ funding sources and relations with other 
organizations, I discovered that NGOs with close links to the ILO were more likely to support 
a complete eradication of child labour, while NGOs with more local links and private funding 
viewed child labour as an inevitable result of economic poverty and hence were opposed to 
its bans. More importantly, however, and regardless of the source of their child-labour 
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ideology, the divergent approaches to child labour have led the NGOs to work against each 
other in the realm of this development issue, which inevitably must have decreased their 
effectiveness. If one NGO pressured parents to withdraw their children from the workplace 
while another offered children of the same age vocational training with the aim of finding a 
job, the money used to fund the development activities was surely not being used in the most 
efficient way. Even more troubling is that neither the parents nor the children involved 
seemed to have had much of a say over the design of the projects and their specific activities. 
This paper does not attempt to offer the ideal remedy to the problem described. Rather, it 
intends to foremost draw greater attention to the fact that the lack of coordination among 
NGOs might be very inefficient with respect to the donor funds used and harmful to the aid 
recipients. One solution could be to encourage a greater level of cooperation and coordination 
among NGOs through the creation of a coordinating body at the national level in El Salvador 
that would attempt to delineate one common approach to child labour and divide the various 
NGO activities within the country to support a more efficient division of labour. Of course, 
one would need to make sure that the domestic populace receiving the ‘benefits’ of the NGO 
work would be sufficiently involved in the identification of the most suitable approach to the 
issue. Alternatively, the government could define a recommended approach to child labour 
and ensure that all NGOs either followed it or at least not worked against it. No solution is 
likely to be flawless; nevertheless, the current situation - which is probably occurring in many 
developing countries, not just in El Salvador, and in many development topics, not only in 
child labour – is inefficient and unsustainable and hence awareness of it and subsequent 
action are required.  
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